Iraq n' Roll

There has been a great deal of commentary about Iraq these past few weeks.  This is thanks to the efforts of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to conquer as much of Iraq as possible.  Of course, the blame game has begun, which made me start thinking back to 2003.  I, like most Americans, believed an invasion of Iraq was necessary to dislodge Saddam Hussein from power.  I was joined in this view by Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and John Kerry, among others.  My own thoughts at the time were that the odious Hussein regime's treatment of its people was so awful, his history of violence against Iraq's neighbors, and support of terrorism so pervasive, and their WMD program so mysterious and undefined, that the best option was to remove Saddam from power.

I was offended by the idea that democracy couldn't work for Arabs.  I believed that once Saddam was removed, the people of Iraq, with the help of Americans, could institute a democratic transition that would eventually provide them with a functioning republic.  I didn't forsee the following:

1. Saddam's regime effectively destroyed any vestige of civil society through its cruel treatment of the people of Iraq.  All institutions of power were completely corrupted by the one iron rule of Iraq:  The only law is the word of Saddam.  This left no base to build upon after the fall of his regime.

2.  The cruelty of Saddam's regime towards the Shia meant that the first thing on the minds of many in that community was REVENGE.

3.  The incredible resilience of tribalism, and its triumph over the modern nation-state.  It was this tribalism that fed the insurgency against the Americans by the Sunni.  The Sunni tribes knew that the new Iraqi government would be dominated by the large Shiite majority, and the Americans were making that possible.  Sunni extremists were happy to provide the firepower.  Only when al-Qaeda began to overreach and undermine the Sunni tribes did the Anbar Awakening begin and the power of al-Qaeda whither away.

Like many people, the painful experience in Iraq led me toward a re-examining of what American foreign policy can achieve.  For me, that led to a more Realist perspective on foreign policy.  I had forgotten the always important Law of Unintended Consequences.  This states that it is always true that government policies will have unintended consequences and sometimes these will be worse than the original problem the policy was intended to fix.  The political Right should keep in mind this law applies both to domestic AND foreign policy.

What's happening in Iraq right now is a consequence of the current Shiite-dominated Iraqi regime's mistreatment of the Sunni minority.  They have shut them out of the halls of power, and the Sunni tribes have turned to ISIS to help them recover some of that power.  In that sense, it's nobody's fault but Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his allies.  However, the domestic political considerations of President Obama led to a complete withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.  He promised he would do it, and he did.  A wiser choice would have been to leave 1,000 to 2,000 military advisers behind to help shore up the Iraqi security forces and act as a positive influence on both the Iraqi government and the relevant tribes.  The cost of this small force would have been militarily and economically insignificant and it might have helped prevent the power grab by al-Maliki that's resulted in the rise of ISIS.

But the past can't be undone.  Which leaves the present predicament.  We have many bad options, some less bad than others.  In the short-term, leaving Iran's proxy forces to battle it out with ISIS is a good example of a time when it would be nice to see both sides lose.  This result would weaken two actors that wish us ill-will.  But it would not be a particularly moral choice.  The civilians of Iraq would suffer the most.  Alternatively, if we intervene on the behalf of the Iraqi government, we become the Shiite Air Force.  This would anger the Sunnis, including the moderate ones who have legitimate grievances against al-Maliki's government.

The best bad option is to covertly supply intelligence information to the Iraqi government, while simultaneously attempting to persuade al-Maliki to resign so that a new, more inclusive government can bring Sunnis and Kurds back into the power structure.  If this doesn't work, then I believe we cast our lot with the Kurds, support their quasi-independent state and use it as a base to harass al-Qaeda as needed.

I am generally in favor of a policy of being LESS active in the Middle East.  We can do great harm and little good there.  That is why I believe the best policy is one that encourages good governance in Iraq, while simultaneously subtly degrading the capabilities of al-Qaeda and ISIS through small-scale covert means.

I am not optimistic about Iraq being able to maintain itself as a nation-state.  The forces of religion and tribalism are too strong  in that part of the world.  However, I do believe we must try to keep it together, for the sake of the millions of people likely to suffer if Iraq breaks apart.